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Post-Earthquake Failure of a Tailings Dam Due to 
Liquefaction of the Pond Deposit 
Kenji Ishihara 
Department of Civil Engineering, University of Tokyo 
ABSTRACT At the time of the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai earthquake of January 15, 1978 in Japan, two darns 
retaining tailings from Mochikoshi gold mine failed, leading to a release of a large volume of tail-
ings. One of the darns, No.1 dike, collapsed almost simultaneously with the shaking of the main 
shock, but another darn, No.2 dike, failed about 24 hours later at a time when there was no shaking. 
The failure of the No.1 dike is known to have been triggered by the liquefaction which developed in 
the tailings deposit in the impoundment pond. The cause of the failure in the No.2 dike has not, 
however, been studied and left open to question. To provide a basis to answer this question, an 
attempt was made to analyze outward movement of phreatic surface within the dike fills which is 
motivated by an increase in pore water pressure due to liquefaction developing in the pond deposit 
behind the retaining dike. It was shown that the phreatic surface could move up to a level near the 
downstream surface by the time the failure of the dike took place. At each stage of the phreatic 
surface movement slope stability analysis was performed using the conventional method and factors of 
safety were calculated. Results of the analyses showed that the factor of safety drops approximate-
ly to unity at the stage when the phreatic surface reaches a location in proximity to the surface of 
the slope. The period of time elapsed for the phreatic surface to reach the near-surface location 
was also computed and shown to be nearly coincident with the time period between when the earthquake 
occurred and when the failure actually took place in the No.2 dike. 
INTRODUCTION 
The tailings deposits in the impoundment ponds 
are usually soft, loose and permanently satu-
rated. Consequently they will tend to liquefy 
at an early stage of major earthquakes, apply-
ing an increased horizontal load on the darn 
retaining the tailings. Therefore, the occur-
rence of liquefaction could be a potential haz-
ard that can lead to catastrophic failure of 
the tailings impoundment darns. In fact, seve-
ral cases of such darn incidents have been re-
ported recently. Failures of the Barahona darn, 
Chile, in 1928 (Aguero, 1929), El Coble darn, 
Chile, in 1965 (Dobry and Alvarez, 1967) and 
Mochikoshi darn, Japan in 1978 (Marcuson, 1979: 
Ohkusa and Anrna, 1980) are typical examples of 
failures of the tailings darns. 
All of these documented cases describe failures 
of darns as having taken place almost simultane-
ously with or immediately after the shaking of 
earthquakes. However, in the case of the inci-
dent at Mochikoshi tailings darns in 1978, Japan, 
while the No.1 darn failed at the same time as 
the main shaking, the breach of the No.2 dike 
took place about one day after the main shock 
of the earthquake at a quiet time without any 
tremor. According to the report (1979) issued 
by the Investigation Committee, the cause of 
the breach at No.1 dike is attributed to the 
occurrence of liquefaction in the disposal pond 
and consequent loss of stability of the retain-
ing darn. With respect to the failure of No.2 
dike, no clear-cut interpretation is presented 
for mechanism triggering the breach, probably 
because the problem was for from conclusive. 
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In view of the context as above, an attempt has 
been made to develop a concept and procedure 
enabling a mechanism of the delayed failure to 
be clarified for the incident of the No.2 dike 
at Mochikoshi. In the following pages, the 
consequence of this study will be presented, 
together with the general outline concerning 
the 1978 earthquake, construction and operation 
of the tailings disposal pond and results of 
soil investigations. The general information 
as above on the Mochikoshi tailings darn was 
quoted from the report of the Investigation 
Comrni ttee. 
IZU-OHSHIMA-KINKAI EARTHQUAKE OF 1978 
On January 14, 1978, a destructive earthquake 
of Magnitude 7.0 shock the southeastern area of 
Izu Peninsula which is located about 120 km 
southwest of Tokyo, Japan (Fig. 1). The epi~ 
center of the main shock was located about 15 km 
off the east coast of the peninsula, midway 
between the peninsula and Ohshima Island as 
shown in Fig. 2. The main shock was followed 
by a series of aftershocks lasting for a week 
with their epicenters moving gradually in a 
westerly direction. The epicenters of the 
aftershocks with a magnitude greater than M = 
4.0 are also indicated in Fig. 2 by solid 
circles. The largest aftershock was a pair of 
shakings that took place at 7:30 a.m. and 7:36 
a.m. on January 15, 1978 with their epicenters 
located approximately in the middle of the Izu-
Peninsula in proximity to the Mochikoshi tail-
ings darn site. Most of the shocks are presumed 
to have had a focal depth of about 10 krn. The 
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Fig. 1. Location of Izu Peninsula 
So.gami Bay 
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Fig. 2. Locations of the main shock and 
aftershocks of Izu- Ohshima-Kinkai 
earthquake 
strong shaking motion produced by the earth-
quake was recorded at several stations, but all 
of them were obtained outside the area of high-
est intensity shaking. A survey of the over-
turning of tombstones in many cemetries near 
the epicentral region disclosed an approximate 
picture of distribution of shaking intensity. 
Fig. 3 shows contour lines of equal maximum 
horizontal acceleration thus established (Ohashi 
et. al, 1978). It may be seen that at Mochiko-
shi site the acceleration is estimated to be 
approximately 250 gal on the ground surface. 
A more detailed account on the earthquake and 
damage feature is given in a previous paper by 
Ishihara and Nagao (1983). 
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Fig. 3. Contours of equal shaking intensity in 
terms of estimated maximum horizontal 
accelerations 
CONSTRUCTION OF TAILINGS CONTAINMENT DIKES 
The Hozukizawa disposal pond at Mochikoshi was 
constructed on a bowl-shaped depression on top 
of a mountain shown in Fig. 4 by sealing off 
the periphery by three dikes. The plan vie~ of 
the pond is shown in Fig. 5. The site cons1sts 
of weathered deposit of cobble-containing tuffs 
which were transported by a series of eruptions 
of volcanos in the mountian ridge in its neigh-
borhood. At the initial stage of construction 
strongly weathered surface portion was stripped 
off and less weathered tuff formation was expos-
ed in a saw-teeth shape to provide rough sur-
face for the foundation of the overlying start-
er dam. The starter dam was constructed in 
1964 by placing local soils of volcanic origi~ 
by means of bulldozers. During the construct1on 
operation the passages of bulldozers helped com-
pact the soils to a desired density. In order 
to provide drainage for water emerging from 
nearby springs, a system of drainage consuit 
was installed at the bottom of the starter dam. 
However, because of a relatively high degree of 
permeability provided by the original mountain 
deposit, no drainage system was installed over 
the bottom of the pond for draining excess 
water resulting from consolidation of tailings 
sludge. 
The mine milling operation to extract gold was 
conducted in the processing plants beside the 
Mochikoshi river (Fig. 4). The tailings produc-
ed there in slurry had been pumped through pipes 
through a height of 600 m up to the dispopal 
pond located on top of the mountain. The 
pupmed-up slurry was delivered either to the 
site of No.1 or No.2 dike and discharged towards 
the pond from three pipes at each dike site. 
The dike was successively raised by placing the 
local volcanic soils at a rate of approximately 
2 m per year by what is called upstream filling 
method. 
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Fig. 4. Location of Hozukizawa Tailings ponds 
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Fig. 5. Plan of the Hozukizawa disposal pond at Mochikoshi 
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DAMAGE TO TAILINGS DAMS 
1. Failure of No.1 Dike 
The failure of No.1 Dike was triggered by the 
main shock of the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai earthquake. 
The feature of the collapse is demonstrated in 







next biggest with a magnitude of 5.4 at 7:36 
a.m. After these shocks around 8:30 a.m., a 
surveillant found five to six cracks developing 
on the downslope face in parallel with the axis 
of the dike. These cracks were reportedly 1 to 
3 meter long with openings about 5 mm wide. At 
a later time around 9:30 p.m., another surveil-
lant discovered a longitudinal crack, opening 
5 m long and 5 em wide in the middle of the 
Fig. 6. Cross-section through embankment of No.1 dike 
dike 28 m high and 73 m wide at crest level 
collapsed almost at the same time as the major 
shaking of the earthquake. A guardian of the 
pond who happened to be stationed at a house on 
the left bank came out immediately upon perceiv-
ing an unusually ~igh shaking and watched the 
terrific moment of disaster. According to his 
account, within a matter of 10 seconds after 
the main shock, the frontal wall of the dike 
swelled and the breach took place at the upper 
part in proximity to the left abutment, follow-
ed by a huge mass of slime rushing down the 
valley with a dreadful wham whereby mowing 
trees and scoring the bottom of the valley. 
When the rushing slime came to the junction 
with the Mochikoshi river, the slime hit the 
flank of masonry walls, jumping up about 10 m 
high on the lift bank of the river channel and 
deposited to about 30 em thickness over the 
road beside the channel. The slime flowed down 
the Mochikoshi river sedimenting in the river 
bed to a thickness of 1.0 to 1.9 m through the 
distance of about 800 m from the point of con-
fluence. The flowing slime further travelled 
into the Kano river and contaminated the river 
through a distance of about 10 km down to the 
mouth of the river. 
The top portion of the No.1 dike failed totally 
through a height of 14 m from the top level of 
impoundment down to the elevation of the start-
er dam, as illustrated in Fig. 6. A total 
volume of 80,000 rna was released as a result 
of the dike failure, of which 60,000 m3 was 
the tailings and 20,000 m3 the dike-forming 
volcanic ashes. 
2. Failure of No.2 Dike 
As described in the foregoing, a series of 
medium-sized earthquakes rocked the central 
part of the Izu peninsula from early morning to 
noon time on the day of January 15, 1978. The 
biggest aftershocks occurred at 7:31 a.m. with 
a magnitude 5.8, followed immediately by the 
downstream slope of the No.2 dike. 
At about 1:00 p.m. on that day, a caretaker 
standing on the opposite side of the No.2 dike 
happened to notice a gradual sinking of the 
central part of the dam. While running to the 
dam site, he watched the dam failing suddenly 
through a crest width of about 20 m leading to 
a release of the impounded tailings sludge. 
Later on the breach was enlarged to a crest 
length of 65 m, generating a number of cracks 
over the sloughing surface. A total volume of 
3,000 m3 consisting of 2,000 rna of tailings 
slime and 1,000 rna of dike material flowed down 
the valley to a distance of about 240 m. The 
feature of the collapse is shown in Fig. 7. 
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The portion of the five-step dike additions 
above the starter dam was taken away, as shown 
in Fig. 7. The plan view of this slide is 
shown in Fig. 5. 
SITE INVESTIGATIONS AND SOIL TESTS 
After the failure of the dikes, in-situ investi-
gation on soils and ground water conditions was 
carried out, together with appropriate labora-
tory tests on tailings and on soil samples 
recovered from the inflicted site. 
1. Soil Profiles and Standard Penetration 
Tests 
Borings were made at 12 locations in and near 
the disposal pond, as indicated in Fig. 5. The 
boring logs in the vicinity of the No.1 dike 
are shown in Figs. 8 through 10 and those con-
ducted near the No.2 dike are demonstrated in 
Figs. 11 through 12. The log of Boring No.2 
drilled from the exposed failure surface reveals 
the presence of a thick layer of fill composed 
of weathered volcanic ashes underlying the de-
posit of the tailings slime. This fill is the 
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 








Fig. 7. Cross-section through embankment of No.2 dike 
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Fig. B. Soil profile at No.1 dike (From report 
of the investigation committee) 
main body of the starter darn. It may been seen 
in Fig. 8 that the fill had a blown count value 
of 3 to 7 in the standard penetration test. The 
log of Boring 4 conducted in the interior part 
of the pond indicates that there exists a thick 
layer of tailings sludge down to a depth of 18 m 
underlaid by an original deposit in the mountain. 
The result of the standard penetration test 
indicates blow count values on the order of 1 to 
2 near the surface but somewhat larger values of 
4 to 9 in the lower half portion of the sludge 
deposit. The progression of consolidation with 
drainage towards the permeable bed soils may 
have stiffen the slime deposit near the bottom 
of the disposal pond. Near the surface which 
coincides with the failure plane, the penetra-
tion rod sank by its self-weight to a depth of 
2 rn without any hammer blow. The presence of 
the extremely soft layer must have acrued as 
a result of liquefaction developed to this ele-
vation during the quake. The log of Boring No. 
10 drilled in the center of the pond indicates a 
1133 
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Fig. 9. Soil profile behind No.1 dike (From 
report of the investigation committee) 
complete soil profile from the pre-earthquake 
surface level not stripped off by the failure. 
The blow count value is equal to zero down to a 
depth of 15 m, whereupon it increases to a value 
between 3 and 6 near the bottom of the slime 
deposit. Underneath the slime layer these 
exists the original deposit of the mountain 
consisting mainly of weathered volcanic ashes. 
The fact that there is little resistance to 
penetration down to the depth of 15 m does not 
appear to have ever been so, but seems to have 
been caused by the occurrence of liquefaction 
due to the earthquake. 
The log of Boring No.8 obtained from the failure 
surface at No.2 dike is demonstrated in Fig. 11, 
where it may be seen that the tailings slime 
deposit was probably remolded down to an eleva-
tion of 614.50 mas a result of liquefaction 
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
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during the earthquake. The layers of deposit 
underlying the tailings slime are those of ori-
ginal mountain deposits at this site, as can be 
seen from the location of this boring site shown 
in Fig. 5. The soil profile data at Boring No. 
5 shown in Fig. 12 was obtained from the top of 




Depth~ttitude Sci l Soil 
(m) (m) profile type 
10 
15 
621-50 .~ 0 ·. v 
-~· 3'? -'v~.'~then!<:l 





614·25 E:=:::: I Clay 
~ fn:rntuff 613-05 
Blow count ( N- valueo) 




Berm an the) 
left side of 
No.2 dike 
Soil profile at No. 2 dik~ (From report 
of the investigation comm~ttee) 
pth ltitude SoH Soil 




629-41 r; " thered 
c · : :- volcanic 
. c: ashes 
627-71 ".? :, (Fitls) 
Silt 
617·46 f.:.,:-:.,.;.;;;,.+---
; .o .. ·~ 
609·91 
' ' 




Blow count (N-valueo) 




( Left bank of) No.2 d;ke 
'T Water table 
Soil profile at No.2 dike (From report 
of the investigation committee) 
portion of the slime deposit. The standard 
penetration test results show a blow count value 
of 4 to 5 for the bulldozer-rolled fill of the 
starter dam. Still another log of Boring 7 
obtained from the top of an intact portion of 
the No.2 dike indicates, as shown in Fig. 13, 
that the bulldozer-rolled fills constructed by 
the stepwise top additions had a blow count 
value of approximately 5. 
Reviews of the boring logs as above indicate 
generally that the slime deposit near the bottom 
of the pond had been consolidated having a blow 
count value of 3 to 7, whereas the slime near 
the failure surface was soft having almost zero 
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blow count value probably because of the remold-
ing due to liquefaction. The containment dikes 
constructed by additions of several steps of 
bulldozer-rolled fills had a blow count value of 
approximately 5 and a similar degree of penetra-
tion resistance was observed for the portion of 
the starter dam. 
2. Phreatic Level and Pearmeability Studies. 
Observation of water level in piezometer pipes 
had been underway in the No.1 dike for surveil-
lance purposes prior to the earthquake. The 
water level along the slope was relatively sta-
tionary and a set of surveillance results made 
latest to the time of the earthquake provided 
levels of phreatic surface at several locations 
on the downstream slope which were consistently 
about 3 m below the slope surface. A straight 
line parallel to the slope surface was thus 
regarded as representing the phreatic line ex-
isting in the No.1 dam at the time of the earth-
quake. For the No.2 dike there is no surveil-
lance data identifying an exact location of the 
phreatic surface. However, in view of almost 
similar conditions in every respect, it may well 
be conceived that the phreatic surface in No.2 
dike was also about 3 m below the slope surface. 
Permeability studies were also conducted both 
in-situ and in the laboratory. The permeability 
coefficient obtained from the in-situ grouting 
method indicated a value on the order of 10-~ 
em/sec for the bulldozer-rolled dike material 
and 10- 3 em/sec for the original bed rock com-
posed of weathered tuffs. The permeability 
coefficient of the tailings deposit was estimat-
ed to be approximately 7 x 10-~ em/sec in the 
horizontal direction , but because of a highly 
stratified nature of the sediment, the permea-
bility in the vertical direction is supposed to 
have been as small as one thousandth to one 
hundredth. 
3. Index Properties and Strength Tests 
Tailings Materials 
Over the surface of the disposal pond on the 
west side of the No.2 dike, a number of sand 
volcanos were observed following the earthquake. 
One of the biggest volcanos about 2 m in diame-
ter of sand spread was carefully excavated to a 
depth of about SO em. The cross-section through 
the sand volcano thus obtained is shown in Fiq. 
14, where it can be seen that sand-containing 
silt (sandy silt) and fine-grained material 
(silt) are deposited, one on top of the other, in 
thin layers 3 to 7 em in thickness. Two batches 
of samples were recovered seperately each from 
the portion of coarse-grained and fine-grained 
layers. The grain size distribution curves for 
each portion are shown in Fig. 15. Also shown 
in Fig. 15 are two grain size distribution 
curves for the blended samples obtained by a 
shovel in block. It is to be noted that there 
is an upper limit in qrain size which is 0.3 mm. 
This is the maximum grain size specified in the 
grinding process of the ore. Fig. 15 also shows 
that the grain size distribution curves for two 
blended samples lie within the range bounded by 
those of the silty sand and silt. Void ratio of 


























Cross section of a sand volcano formed 
on the surface of the disposal pond 
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gravity was 2.72 and 2.74, respectively, for the 
sandy silt and silt portion. Plasticity index 
was 10 for the silt but the sandy silt was 
identified as non-plastic. The index properties 
of the tailings are summarized Table 1. 
Several series of cyclic as well as static 
strength tests were conducted on both disturbed 
and undisturbed samples of the tailings sludge 
by using the triaxial test apparatus. These 
triaxial tests were run under consolodated-
undrained conditions with pore water pressure 
measurements. Results of cyclic tests on dis-
turbed specimens are described in a previous 
publication (Ishihara et al, 1980). Undisturbed 
samples of the tailings were secured by means of 
First International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu
Table 1. Physical properties of tailings 
Items Notations Sandy silt Silt 
Specific Gravity Gs 2-72 2-74 
Liquid Limit Wt. ("!.) 27 31 
Plastic Limit Wp ("!.) Non-plastic 21 
Plasticity Index PI Non-plastic 10 
In-situ 
w ("!.) 36 37 water contant 
In-situ e 0-98 1-00 
void ratio 
In-situ consoli- c.cc'"%,;nl -- 0-1-0-8 dation coefficient load (0-0.6 k~) 
In-situ volume mvccm}kg) S.5-22X10·Z 
compressibility -- load(Q-0.6k9/crrf) 
thin-wall tubes. The samples encased in the 
tubes were once frozen to minimize the distur-
bance during transportation. The samples were 
thawed in the laboratory and tested with an 
appropriate back pressure to ensure full satura-
tion of the specimen. Results of the static 
triaxial shear tests indicated zero cohesion 
component (C' = 0) and an angle of internal 
friction,¢', varying between 30° and 39°, in 
terms of the effective stress representation. 
The angle of internal friction for the Mochiko-
shi tailings material was shown to be expressed 
approximately by 
tan¢' 0. 7 ••••••• (1) 
e 
where e denotes the void ratio. One of the 
results of the cyclic triaxial shear tests is 
shown in Fig. 16 in terms of a relationship 
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Fig. 16. Cyclic stress ratio versus number of 
cycles for undisturbed tailings 
samples from the pond (From report of 
the investigation committee) 
between the cyclic stress ratio, crd~/2(cro'l 
versus the number of cycles required to produce 
5 % double-amplitude axial strain in the test 
specimen, where crdi denotes the amplitude of 
cyclic axial stress and cr 0 ' is the initial con-
fining pressure. Fig. 16 shows that the cyclic 
stress ratio causing 5 % double-amplitude axial 
strain in 20 cycles is on the order of 0.2. The 
results of the tests on other samples from 
different sampling sites and from different 
depths showed more or less similar values of 
cyclic strength to those shown in Fig. 16. 
Scrutiny of all the test results showed that 
the cyclic strength of the Mochikoshi tailings 
may as well be represented by an empirical 
formula which is promulgated in the Japanese 
Design Code for tailings dams (Ishihara et al, 
1981). According to the code, the cyclic 
stress ratio causing 5 % double-amplitude 
strain in 20 cycles of load application, R~, is 
expressed as, 
0.50 
0. 085 log1 o (--) 
Ds o 
••• (2) 
;.1here N is the blow count value in the standard 
penetration test, and crv' is the effective over-
burden pressure in terms of kg/cm2 • 
Dike Materials 
The dikes were constructed of a mixture of the 
weathered tuffs and volcanic ashes covering 
widespread area of the mountains in the vicini-
ty. The material is a potpourri of gravel, sand 
and silt, as visualized from the wide range of 
the grain size distribution curve shown in Fig. 












Fig. 17. Distribution of grain sizes in the 
dikes (From report of the investi-
gation committee) 
performed on undisturbed samples secured in 
chunk near the surface and also on samples re-
covered in thin-walled tubes from bored holes. 
Wet unit weight, y, of the soil ranged between 
14 and 19 kN/m 3 , natural water content, w, was 
30 to 60 % and void ratio was 1.1 to 2.6. The 
permeability coefficient of the soil was shown 
to be approximately on the order of l0- 4 cm/sec. 
With respect to the strength, the consolidated-
undrained triaxial shear tests on undisturbed 
1136 
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samples trimmed from blocks indicated a cohe-
sion of about C1 = 25 kN/m 2 and an average 
angle of interna.l friction of cp' = 35 °. For 
the dike material, the cyclic triaxial test was 
not performed. 
STABILITY ANALYSES DURING THE EARTHQUAKE 
1. Analysis of Liquefaction 
Following the earthquake a number of sand 
volcanos were observed on the intact part of 
the pond surface which was not disrupted by the 
flow slide. Also, in view of the surprisingly 
huge volume of the tailings involved in the 
flow slide, it was suspected that occurrence of 
liquefaction might have been responsible for 
touching off a slide movement of such huge 
quantity of soil. In view of this, the Inves-
tigation Committee made a detailed analysis on 
the likelihood of liquefaction occurring in 
the tailings deposit on the basis of the labo-
ratory test results. A detailed study was also 
performed for assessing the input motion to be 
incorporated in the response analyses at this 
site. The maximum horizontal acceleration at 
the base rock was estimated to have been on the 
order of 90 gal during the shaking due to the 
main shock. Seismic response analyses were 
conducted for different soil profiles in the 
pond by using the one-dimensional wave propaga-
tion theory. The results of the analyses indi-
cated that the maximum horizontal acceleration 
at the surface level of the disposal pond might 
have probably been in the range of 150 and 250 
gal. The analysis of liquefaction was then 
made by comparing the seismically induced shear 
stress to the magnitude of shear stress requir-
ed to cause failure in the corresponding load-
ing conditions. The results of such analyses 
indicated that the liquefaction could indeed 
occur and it could extend down to a depth of 
approximately 7 m from the surface of the dis-
posal pond. 
2. Pseudo-Static Stability Analyses 
By incorporating different values of seismic 
coefficient varying between 0.15 and 0.25, 
slope stability analyses were made for a cir-
cular slip surface representing the actual slid-
ing planes shown in Figs. 6 and 7. The factor 
of safely against sliding was calculated using 
the following formula, 
F - U·9,)tan¢'+ C' ·£) ••• [3) 
Z[Wsina + kHWcosa) 
were w denotes the weight of saturated soil in 
each sliced element, u is the excess pore water 
pressure, kH is the seismic coefficient, a is 
the angle of inclination of slip plane at the 
bottom of each slice and £ denotes the length 
of the slip plane at the bottom of each element. 
The notations are illustrated in Fig. 18. 
Analysis for No.1 dike 
The stability analysis was made by the Investi-
1137 
Fig. 18. Division into sliced elements for the 
stability analysis 
gation Committee (1979) for a cross section of 
the dike having soil properties shown in Fig. 
19. The result of the stability analysis show-
ed that for the static condition prior to the 
earthquake, the factor of safely was 2.32 for 
No.1 dike. In the seismic loading condition, 
two cases were considered. In the first case, 
no excess pore water pressure was allowed for 
in the analysis and the magnitude of seismic 
coefficient necessary to bring the computed 
factor of safely to unity was shown to be as 
large as 0.3. Then, in the second case some 
appropriately assessed value of excess pore 
water pressure due to the seismic shaking was 
taken into account in the stability computation 
by Eq. (3) . It was found that the seismic co-
efficient of 0.17 was large enough to bring down 
the factor of safety to unity from the initial 
value of 2.32. 
Fig. 19. Cross section of No.1 dike with soil 
properties used in the stability 
analysis 
Analysis for No.2 dike 
The stability analysis for the static loading 
prior to the earthquake was made by the Investi-
gation Committee (1979) for a cross section of 
the dike having soil properties shown in Fig. 
20. The result of analysis indicated a factor 
of safety of 2.75. In the case of seismic load-
ing conditions, the seismic coefficient value as 
much as 0.4 was shown to be needed to bring the 
computed factor of safety to unity, if no excess 
pore water pressure is taken into accout. When 
the excess pore water pressure is allowed for in 
the stability computation, the value of the 
seismic coefficient to bring the safety factor 
' 
i ! 
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Fig. 20. Cross section of No.2 dike with soil 
properties used in the stability 
analysis 
down to unity was 0.23. 
As described above, the computed factor of 
safety for No.1 dike becomes equal to unity, if 
a seismic coefficient of 0.17 is incorporated 
into the analysis with a prope.r assessment of 
excess pore water pressures caused by the earth-
quake shaking. This magnitude of seismi~ c?ef-
ficient was considered reasonable well w~th~n 
the range of 0.15 and 0.25 predicted from the 
seismic response analysis. It was then sought 
what the factor of safety would be for the 
stability of No.2 dike under the identical con-
ditions in which the failure of No.1 dike did 
occur. Using the seismic coefficient of 0.17 
and incorporating the effects of similarly 
assessed excess pore water pressures, the factor 
of safety was calculated to be about 1.5 for 
No.2 dike. The Investigation Committee then 
concluded that the No.2 dike had been potential-
ly more stable than the embankment of No.1 darn 
approximately by a factor of 1.5. 
POST-EARTHQUAKE STABILITY ANALYSIS 
As mentioned in the foregoing, the No.1 dike of 
the Mochikoshi tailings impoundment pond failed 
almost at the same time of the major shaking of 
the main shock and a reasonable interpretation 
was accorded to the cause of the failure on the 
basis of the pseudo-static method of stability 
analysis by incorporating a seismic coefficient 
and effects of excess pore water pressures gen-
erated by the earthquake. 
On the other hand, the No.2 dike of the disposal 
pond survived the damage during the main shock 
and a series of subsequent shocks as well. 
However, this dike eventually failed about 24 
hours after the main shock while there was no 
shaking. The cause or mechanism of the failure 
of this dike was not discussed exhaustively in 
the report of the Investigation Committee and 
has been left open to question since then. It 
is to offer an answer to this question that the 
present study was undertaken. The basic con-
cepts and procedures for examining the stability 
of this dike consist in clarifying time-changes 
in seepage conditions caused by the movement of 
the phreatic surface within the dike. This 
aspect of the problem together with procedures 
for eveluating its effects will be discussed in 
.detail in the following sections. 
1. A Method of Analysis for Movement of 
Phreatic Surface 
It is highly likely that the build-up of pore 
water pressure due to liquefaction in the de-
posit behind the dike created an unbalanced 
state of seepage conditions within the deposi~ 
underlying the dike. A newly created hydraul~c 
gradient appears to have then raised the ~leva­
tion of the phreatic surface w~htin ~he.d7ke, 
leading eventually to a precar~ous cond~t~on of 
the embankment even in the static state after a 
series of earthquake shakings. It would, ~h~r~­
fore, be necessary first to explore a poss~b~l~­
ty of analytical treatment in which time-changes 
of the phreatic surface can be assessed. 
The layout of the present problem in illustrated 
in Fig. 21. Let it be first assumed that lique-
faction due to the main shock of the earthquake 
Fig. 21. Setting for analysis of phreatic 
surface movement 
developed to a depth of H and any change in 
seepage conditions in the deposit below this 
elevation can be disregarded. The dike con-
structed of cohesive materials is represented by 
the section OEDB in Fig. 21 and a deposit of 
tailings below the dike is represented by a 
triangular section OBA. It will also be assumed 
that the phreatic surface had been located, 
prior to the earthquake, along the interface OB 
between the main body of the dike and the under-
lying tailings deposit. If the ground water 
level within the pond is assumed to coincide 
approximately with the surface of the tailings 
deposit, and if the tailings below the dike is 
assumed to have completed consolidation, then 
water pressure at depth, H, prior to the earth-
quake is YwH and its distribution is hydrostatic 
as indicated by OAP in Fig. 21, where Yw is unit 
weight of water. It may as well be assumed that 
the pre-earthquake water pressure distribution 
along a horizontal plane AB at depth, H, is re-
presented by a triangle ABR. 
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As described in the foregoing section, liquefac-
tion did develop during the shaking of the main 
shock in the deposit of the disposal pond. 
However, it is likely that the liquefaction 
occurred only in the portion of the pond where 
the tailings deposit is exposed on the surface. 
The portion of the tailings deposit covered by 
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the dike might not have undergone liquefaction 
because of a high confining stress exerted by 
the overlying dike fills. Therefore, it will 
be assumed that any pore water pressure change 
in the deposit below the dike were not brought 
about by the liquefaction of its own but caused 
by a propagation of the excess pore water pres-
sures from the liquefied deposit behind the 
dike. Upon development of liquefaction in the 
pond, the hydrostatic pressure at depth, H, 
rose by an amount, Y'H, as indicated by PQ 
where Y' is unit submerged weight of the tail-
ings material. Therefore, the pressure distri-
bution along the horizontal plane AB may well 
be assumed to have increased by an amount re-
presented by a triangle RBS in Fig. 21. It may 
as well be assumed that such a change in pore 
water pressure distribution has taken place in 
a relatively short period of time following the 
onset of liquefaction. The increase in pressure 
as above then created a hydraulic gradient which 
is directed towards the surface of the bank and 
accordingly migration of water is expected to 
have been motivated in the direction of ascend-
ing the phreatic surface within the dike. The 
configuration of the phreatic surface will be 
assumed to be a straight line passing through 
point 0 at all instances of time during the 
ascent of the phreatic surface. To develop an 
analysis for the phreatic surface movement let 
it be assumed that within a time interval, t, 
from the onset of liquefaction the phreatic 
surface has moved from the location OB up to OC, 
which is represented by the coordinate, x, taken 
leftwards from point B in Fig. 21. At this 
instant of time, the hydraulic gradient of water 
flow may be taken as 
y'H 
Yw L + x ) 
where L is the distance between points A and B 
in Fig. 21. If the location of the phreatic 
surface is assumed to move through a small dis-
tance, ~x, in a small time interval, ~t, then 
the amount of water migrating across the current 
phreatic line OC is calculated on the basis of 




YH ( L + X ) 
. ~t 
where k is the permeability coefficient and H/2 
is an equivalent cross sectional area across 
which the ground water moves. The water which 
has migrated across the current phreatic surface 
is stored in the pores of the soil existing in 
partially saturated zone. The quantity of water 
that can be stored is given by 
S ..!!_ ~X 
2 
where H~x/2 indicates an area of the triangle 
OC'C in Fig. 21 and S is the storage capacity 
coefficient. Since the amount of inflow must 





k Yw L + X 
••••••• [ 4) 
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Solving this differential equation under an 
initial condition x = 0, when t = 0, one ~btains 
~ = -1 + J 1 + 2 ~~ ~ ~~ ••••• (5) 
The relationship of Eq. (5) is numerically pres-
ented in Fig. 22, where the ratio, x/L, speci-
fying the front of the moving phreatic surface 
is plotted versus the time factor, kt/(SL}, for 
different values of H/L. Considering a most 
representative case encountered with tailings 
deposits, the buoyant unit weight, Y', is assu-
med to be 9. 5 kN/m 3 • 
Fig. 22. Travel distance of phreatic surface 
with time 
2. Movement of Phreatic Surface in No.2 Dike 
The analysis of liquefaction as described in 
the preceding section indicated that the deposit 
in the tailings pond had liquefied during the 
main shock of the earthquake to a depth of ap-
proximately 7 m. It is also known that the 
phreatic surface through the No.2 dike prior to 
the earthquake had probably been located at a 
depth of 3 m from the downslope face of the dike. 
Therefore, with reference to the geometrical con-
figuration shown in Fig. 23, values of H and L 
may be set as H = 7 m and L = 21 m, and therefore 
H/L = 1/3. According to the laboratory tests, 
permeability coefficient of the dike material was 
shown to be on the order of k = lo-•cmjsec. With 
respect to the storage coefficient, S, there is 
no measured data either from in-situ or from any 
laboratory test. However, it should be recalled 
that the storage coefficient is defined as a 
function of porosity, n, and saturation ratio, 
Sr, as follows, 
S = n ( 1 - Sr ••••••• ( 6) 
The right-hand side of Eq. (6) is equal to the 
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volume of air void per total gross volume of 
soil. Therefore, if a soil is brought to a 
completely saturated state as a result of mig-
ration of water, the associated storage capaci-
ty can be correctly represented by the coeffi-









Y2 = 19·1 kN/m3, ¢>~ =35•, C1=25 kN/m2 
Sliding surface and soil properties 
used in the stability analysis 
remains still partially saturated, the storage 
capacity will be somewhat smaller than that 
predicted by Eq. (6). In spite of some uncer-
tainty as above, Eq. (6) seems to give a value 
of storage coefficient with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy that can be used for all practical 
purposes. For the dike-forming material, the 
laboratory tests showed that n = 0.6 and Sr = 
80 %. Therefore, the value of the storage 
capacity is calculated through Eq. (6) as being 
approximately S = 0.12. 
The failure of No.2 dike took place around 1:00 
p.m. on 15th of January, about 24 hours after 
the main shock. Therefore, assuming the move-
ment of the phreatic surface to have started 
following the onset of liquefaction, the period 
of elapsed time by the occurrence of the failure 
may be taken as about 24 hours. Then, by intro-
ducing t = 24 hours, the time factor in Eq. (5) 
is calculated as, 
kt 
SL 
10-4 X 24 X 60 X 60 
0.12 X 21 X 100 
0.034 
Read off from Fig. 22 a value of x/L correspond-
ing to the time factor of 0.034, one obtains x/L 
= 0.013 and, therefore, the travel distance of 
the phreatic surface is estimated to be x = 
0.013 x 21 = 0.27 m. 
The movement of the phreatic surface as computed 
above is too short to produce any significant 
change in a seepage condition influencing the 
stability of the dike. Therefore, some factors 
appear to be missing, and some other thoughts 
may need to be explored. 
It is to be recalled here that, in the case of 
the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai Earthquake, a series of 
fairly large aftershocks took place near the dam 
site beginning around 3:00 a.m. in the morning 
of 15th of January, 1978 and continued until 
about 9:00 a.m. on that day. A chain of events 
that occurred during this period of time is dis-
played in Fig. 24. It can be seen that a pair 
of greatest aftershocks with magnitude, 5.8 and 
5.4 successively occurred at 7:31a.m. and 7:36 
a.m., respectively, on January 15th, (Tsumura 
et al, 1978). On the other hand, as mentioned 
in the foregoing section, a surveillant dis-
covered several strips of fissures running in 
parallel to the axis of the dike after this 
series of aftershocks. This fact would appear 































Fig. 24. Occurrence of aftershocks with magni-
tude greater than 4.0 following the 
main shock of the Izu-Ohshima-Kinkai 
earthquake 
cracks were created within the fills as a re-
sult of the shakings due to the pair of the 
greatest aftershocks. Therefore, there are 
reasons to believe that the permeability of the 
dike had been significantly enhanced. Although 
there is no way for knowing a correct permea-
bility characteristics, it may well be assumed 
with a judgement that the gross permeability 
coefficient had increased to a value on the 
order of magnitude of k = 2 x l0- 2 cm/sec as a 
result of crack development over the slope of 
the No.2 dike. It may as well be assumed that 
the period of elapsed time between when the 
permeability was significantly increased and 
when the failure took place in No.2 dike is 
approximately 5.5 hours 
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With the above reasonings in mind, the time 
change of the phreatic surface in the No.2 dike 
may be reevaluated as follows. The time factor, 
kt/SL, appearing in Eq. (5) can be reevaluated as, 
kt 
SL 
2 X 10- 2 X 5.5 X 60 X 60 
0.12 X 21 X 100 
1. 57 
With reference to the curve in Fig. 22, the 
travel distance of the phreatic surface is com-
puted as 
X = 0.4l·L 0.41 X 21 8.6 m 
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The distance of travel as computed above seems 
to give a reasonable order of magnitude for the 
effects of changes in the phreatic surface to 
be allowed for in evaluating the stability of 
the slope in No.2 dike. 
3. Time Changes in Factor of Safety in No.2 
Dike 
The simplified analysis for the movement of the 
phreatic surface as described above indicated 
that, owing to the development of cracks and 
consequent drastic increase in permeability of 
the fills, the phreatic surface must have moved 
up to a level where the stability of the slope 
was seriously endangered. Therefore, it will 
be of interest to investigate how the factor of 
safety, indicative of the degree of stability, 
changed with time depending upon the location 
of the phreatic surface. 
The factor of safety was computed by means of 
the formula in Eq. (3) whereby disregarding the 
pseudo-static seismic force terms. Exactly the 
same soil profile and soil strength parameters 
as shown in Fig. 23 were employed in the sta-
bility analyses. The term allowing for the 
excess pore water pressure was evaluated graphi-
cally as illustrated in Fig. 25. This figure 




Fig. 25. Layout for the stability analysis 
shows a state of the dike profile where the 
front of phreatic surface has advanced to point 
C halfway between the initial location, B, and 
the point D at the toe of the slope surface. 
It is assumed, as mentioned in the foregoing 
section, that the pore water pressure at point 
A had increased by an amount, y 'H , as a result 
of liquefaction that developed in the pond 
behind the dike. Therefore, the excess pore 
water pressure at point A is laid off as the 
length RS on the diagram by an appropriate 
scale. Since there exists a sufficient amount 
of liquefied material behind the dike, and 
hence a continuous supply of water from behind, 
the magnitude of excess pore water pressure at 
point A may be assumed to have remained unchang-
ed for a reasonably long period of time. On 
the basis of this assumption, the distribution 
of excess pore water pressure on the horizontal 
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plane ABC may well be represented by a rectan-
gle RSCB. In the computational scheme of sta-
bility, a sliding circle was determined from 
the observed surface of failure in No.2 dike, 
and the soil mass above this sliding plane was 
divided into 6 slices as shown in Fig. 25. To 
illustrate the graphical procedure for estimat-
ing the pore water pressure, consider a sliced 
soil element labelled "4" in Fig. 25. Since 
the pore water pressure at point I is repre-
sented by the length IT and that at the surface 
point 0 is zero, the distribution of pore water 
pressure along the line OI may be approximated 
by a straight line OT. Therefore, at point H 
at the bottom center of the slice 4 in question, 
the total pore water pressure can be determined 
by drawing a vertical line through point H and 
locating the point U at its intersection with 
the line OT representing the distribution of 
pore water pressure along the line OI. The 
total pore water pressure at point H is there-
fore represented by the length HU. The pore 
water Dressures thus determined for all other 
sliced~soil elements, being indicated by upward 
arrows in Fig. 25, were employed in the compu-
tational scheme of stability analysis using the 
formula in Eq. (3) • Factors of safety were com-
puted in this manner for several stages of 
movement of the phreatic surface. The result 
of these analyses is presented in Fig. 26. by 
- ~Before_!ique~lon 












0 5 10 
Trav~l distance, X , of the phreatic surface (m) 
Fig. 26. Change of factor safety caused by the 
movement of phreatic surface 
plotting the computed factor of safety against 
the travel distance of the phreatic surface. 
The corresponding period of elapsed time com-
puted through Eq. (5) is also indicated in Fig. 
26. In the static condition prior to the earth-
quake, the factor of safety was computed as 
being 2.75 as mentioned in the foregoing, but it 
dropped drastically to 1.85 upon development of 
liquefaction in the tailings deposit behind the 
No.2 dike due to the shaking of the main shock 
which occurred at 12:30 p.m. on January 14, 1978. 
It is to be noted that at this stage the pore 
water pressure increase due to the liquefaction 
is assumed to have propagated into the portion 
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of the tailings deposit underlying the dike 
but not yet pushed up the initial level of the 
phreatic surface prior to the e~rthquake. In 
the computational scheme shown in Fig. 25, the 
distribution of pore water pressure along the 
horizontal plane GD was taken to be a triangle 
of ASB for the stability analysis of this 
stage. Since no singificantly strong after-
shock had taken place until 7:30 a.m. in the 
morning of the next day, the front of the 
phreatic surface had not presumably advanced 
to an extent producint any significant change 
in the computed factor of safety. However, 
when a couple of large aftershocks occurred 
around 7:30a.m., several strips of visible 
fissures developed over the surface of the 
dike, leading to a sharp increase in the per-
meability of the dike fills. From then on, 
the front of the phreatic surface had pre-
sumably moved at a faster rate whereby re-
ducing gradually the factor of safety. The 
decreasing feature of the computed factor of 
safety during this stage is also shown in Fig. 
26. At about 1:00 p.m., 5.5 hours after the 
occurrence of the large aftershocks, the phrea-
tic surface had probably moved through a dis-
tance of about 8.6 m approaching the toe of the 
dike surface bringing the embankment to a very 
precarious state. The computed factor of 
safety at this stage was 0.98 as accordingly 
indicated in Fig. 26, and, therefore, the 
safety of the dike is considered to have been 
seriously endangered. It is indeed at this 
stage that the failure actually took place in 
the fills of the No.2 dike. 
Although the reasonings as above can provide a 
simple interpretation for the mechanism trig-
gering the post-earthquake failure of the dike, 
they are based on several unverified assump-
tions. Among the most critical but most diffi-
cult to evaluate by any means is the permea-
bility coefficient of the dike-composing fills 
containing numerous cracks and fissures. The 
assumption on the distribution of liquefaction 
induced pore water pressure is also unproved 
and could be too much of approximation. 
Therefore, the reasonings as above may have to 
be taken qualitatively rather than in the 
quantitative sense. 
CONCLUSIONS 
About one day after the main shock of the Izu-
Ohshima-Kinkai earthquake, a failure occurred 
in an embankment of No.2 dike enclosing the 
tailings disposal pond at Mochikoshi, Izu, 
Japan. To clarify the mechanism triggering the 
slide, a simple analysis was made for an upward 
movement of the phreatic surface within the 
dike which is activated by an excess pore water 
pressure resulting from liquefaction of the 
tailings deposit behind the dike. With a 
proper assessment of permeability of fills in 
the dike, and based on several assumptions, the 
analysis result indicated a significant amount 
of movement of the phreatic surface which could 
have occurred in the dike during a period of 
several hours from the time of major after-
shocks to the dike failure. For several key 
instances of time with rising phreatic surface, 
a series of static slope stability analyses was 
made using the conventional method whereby 
allowing for redistribution of excess pore water 
pressures generated by the earthquake. ~he . 
factor of safety computed for the stage ~mmedl­
ately after the main shock was 1.85 but follow-
ing a series of aftershocks, the factor of 
safety was conceived to have decreased gradually 
due to a sharp increase in permeability of the 
dike fills caused by the development of cracks 
and fissures in the embankment. About 5.5 hours 
after the occurrence of the aftershocks, the 
computed factor of safety dropped to a value 
close to unity, indicating that the bank was 
brought to a very precarious state. The comp~t­
ed result of analysis was thus shown to be co~n­
cident with what actually happened in the em-
bankment. 
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